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CONFLICT OF LAWS-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
JOHN W. WAbE*
DOMIvCILE

The requirement of residence in the Tennessee divorce statutes'
has been construed to mean domicile.2 Two cases during the Survey
period raise the issue of domicile in this connection. In Bernardi v.
Bernardis the question was whether a member of the armed services
had acquired a domicile in the state. The complainant, stationed at
Millington Naval Base in Shelby County, had married defendant two
months after arriving. Defendant was a minor with parents domiciled
in Mississippi but had lived in Memphis for over a year. The parties
established a home, complainant alleging that they intended it to
be their permanent home, that he expected to get a job with the
Memphis Fire Department and that he had secured a permanent registration certificate for voting. The suit for divorce was on the ground
of admitted adultery; it was not contested though the defendant was
personally served. The court below granted the divorce and the
Divorce Proctor for Shelby County appealed, claiming lack of jurisdiction.
The court of appeals affirmed. Admitting that in previous cases the
holding had been that a member of the armed services had not acquired a domicile in the state when based there,4 the court explained
that they had not laid down a legal rule that domicile could not be
so acquired but had simply required that there be "the clearest and
most unequivocal proof." In this case the court below had found
that domicile was proved, and the facts were held to justify the
holding. The case illustrates a growing trend toward liberality in
finding a domicile established under similar circumstances.5
The authority of the case is weakened, however, by the fact that
it is an alternative holding. The court goes on to hold that even if
the plaintiff was not domiciled in the state, the defendant might be
found to be so domiciled. Her marriage emancipated her and let her
* Dean, Vanderbilt University School of Law; member, Tennessee Bar.
1. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-803-04 (1955).
2. Brown v. Brown, 150 Tenn. 89, 261 S.W. 959 (1923). See Reese and Green,
That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND.L. REV. 561 (1953).
3. 302 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
4. Tyborowski v. Tyborowski, 28 Tenn. App. 583, 192 S.W.2d 231 (M.S: 1945);
Sturdavant v. Sturdavant, 28 Tenn. App. 273, 189 S.W.2d 410 (M.S. 1944).
5. Cases are collected in Annot., 21 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1952); see Note, 31 N.C.
L. REV. 304 (1953). Statutes in some states now provide that residence of a
service man for a required period of time is sufficient without any finding
of domicile. See, e.g., Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127
(1954).
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establish a domicile separate from that of her parents. When she
married she would normally have the same domicile as that of her
husband, but under Tennessee law she could acquire a separate
domicile. 6 This might be held to have been done even while the
parties were living together if the only reason why the husband's
domicile had not changed was his status as a member of the armed
services; it was more clearly accomplished after the parties separated
7
and the defendant continued to reside in Memphis.
One minor holding in the Bernardi case is somewhat questionable.
It appears that the complainant had brought an earlier suit which
had been dismissed by the trial court without prejudice; the court
had ruled otherwise on this second trial and granted the divorce.
The appellate court said in this connection, "if it be assumed that
such dismissal was because the court at that time conceived that it
did not have jurisdiction, then we think the court was in error in
so ruling. In any event, the judge had a perfect right to change his
mind with reference to that ruling and, at the second trial, we think
he made the correct ruling."8 The dismissal in the first trial was not
a ruling on the merits, but if it was a ruling of lack of jurisdiction it
was not appealed from and should be res judicata on that issue. Of
course, it would be possible to find that the facts had changed in the
meantime, with the additional facts since the first trial indicating
a change of domicile; but this would seem to be the only basis on
which the principle of res judicata could be properly circumvented.
The case of Greene v. Greene9 involved the domicile of a person
transferred at his request from Wisconsin to the Veterans' Hospital
in Memphis. He spent much time in the home of his cousin in Memphis, and although he was attending college in Illinois at the time of
bringing the divorce action, the court had no trouble in holding that
his domicile was in Tennessee on the basis of the Bernardi case.
CHOICE OF LAw

Contracts-FirstAmerican National Bank v. Automobile Insurance
Co. 10 was an action on eleven policies of fire insurance covering a
warehouse located in Kentucky. Plaintiff, a Nashville bank, had
loaned money to construct the warehouse and taken a mortgage which
was "executed, acknowledged, delivered and recorded" in Kentucky.
The insurance policies all had loss-payable clauses naming the bank
as mortgagee. The insurance companies had failed to pay promptly,
and the suit demanded the amount due under the policies, plus 25%
6. Younger v. Gianotti, 176 Tenn. 139, 138 S.W.2d 448, 128 A.L.R. 1413 (1940).
7. 302 S.W.2d at 68.
8. Id. at 69.
9. 309 S.W.2d 403 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
10. 252 F.2d 62 (6th Cir. 195.8).

1192

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[(VOL. 11

additional liability under the Tennessee statute imposing a penalty for
refusal to pay in 60 days." The insurance companies admitted liability
and the only question was whether the Tennessee penalty statute applied.
Both the district court and the court of appeals held for the defendants on this issue. Acknowledging that the Tennessee conflict of laws
rule governed, the courts held that the insurance policies were Kentucky contracts, governed by Kentucky law. They found that "every
act necessary to make each of the policies herein a complete and binding contract of insurance was performed in the State of Kentucky,"
and on this assumption the holding would seem to be in accord with
Tennessee decisions. The additional holding in the case, that it would
have been a violation of several clauses of the U. S. Constitution for
Tennessee courts to apply the statute, is somewhat more doubtful. 12
Effective arguments could be made that the problem is one of performance of contract and thus controlled by Tennessee law as the place
where payment was to be made under the loss-payable clause, or that
it is one of damages and thus to be characterized as procedure and
controlled by the law of the forum.
Torts.-In Schenk v. Gwaltney13 the court followed the usual rule
of choice of law in torts cases. An automobile accident having happened in Indiana, the Indiana automobile guest statute was held to
apply, though the court intimated that if the accident had occurred in
Tennessee where there was no such statute, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur would have permitted a jury verdict for the plaintiffs to stand.
Limitation of Actions.-The code section tolling the running of the
statute of limitations while the defendant is absent from the state
was construed in Shelton v. Breeding14 as follows: "We think the
purpose of the quoted statute was to give the plaintiff a full year in
which he might sue the defendant; that this contemplated the defendant being within the state and available for the service of process."' 5
This apparently meant that all time while the defendant was out of
the state must be excluded, so that when he was frequently in and
out of the state the times when he was in the state must be tacked
6
together to constitute the year.'
11. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1105 (1955).

12. The court relied on the earlier Supreme Court decisions of Hartford

Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924). Later Supreme Court
decisions have been much more liberal in allowing states to apply their own
laws to insurance policies or actions when they had contacts with the transaction. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66
(1954); Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).

13.
14.
15.
16.

309 S.W.2d 424 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
310 S.W.2d 469 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1957).
Id. at 472.
The court explains that under the current nonresident-motorist statute,
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ACTIONS QUASI IN REM

Interpleader.-InAmerican Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Newland,"' the insurance company had issued a policy on the life of LaMoyne. The beneficiary was his sister, Myrtle, a resident of Texas, who had apparently
paid the premiums until her death. Thereafter at the request of LaMoyne, the company issued new policies, making his daughter the
beneficiary. On LaMoyne's death, the daughter and Texas relatives
of the sister claimed the proceeds, and the company brought this
interpleader action. The lower court sustained a plea in abatement by
the Texas claimants on the ground that no jurisdiction was obtained
over them by constructive process. The Supreme Court affirmed on
the ground that the company might well be liable to both sets of
claimants. On petition to rehear because the only question before the
court was one of jurisdiction, the court denied the petition, saying that
"it is 'only when some res of the nonresident defendant is found and
impounded within the territorial limits of the state of action, and
then only to the extent of such res' does the Court of action obtain jurisdiction of the defendant who is a nonresident of that state and not
served with personal process."'18 This is in accordance with the position
taken by the U. S. Supreme Court. 19
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-224 (1955), plaintiff would have been able to obtain
service on the secretary of state, but the amendment to include a resident
absent from the state more than 30 days took place only after this action was
brought.
17. 303 S.W.2d 332 (Tenn. 1957).
18. Id. at 334.
19. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).

